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ABSTRACT
This paper aims to answer the question of why constituent moments are relevant to political theory. 
It hypothesises the Spanish constitutional debate of 1931 as a case of conceptual innovation in parliamentary 
politics by arguing that debates in constituent moments entail a special kind of parliamentary argumenta-
tion when new political regimes are established. There, all sorts of theoretical, normative, historical, and 
institutional aspects are discussed to deliberate on the future character and functioning of a political regime. 
From a methodological point of view, this analysis draws on the revision of arguments and political terms 
used by MPs during the Spanish constituent assembly of 1931. The first part of the article emphasises the 
potentiality of constitutional debates for political theory and conceptual history, the two following chapters 
contextualise the historical and intellectual keys of 1931 Spain, the fourth and final part briefly explains 
two cases of conceptual controversy around the terms “state” and “sovereignty”. Based on the evidence 
provided by this study, the article concludes that the Spanish constitutional debate of 1931 is a fertile case 
to explore conceptual innovation of interwar legal and political theory.
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Constitutional debates contain a wide range of legal expertise and intellectual 
references anchored in the history of political thought. Divergent and opposite views 
about the state, political and civil rights, together with the rationale of public policies, 
are reflected in parliamentary deliberations. As a direct consequence, contested new 
meanings of classic political concepts arise. Unlike regular parliamentary debates, 
intellectual references that are embedded in constitutional debates at parliamenta-
ry settings connect national with international experiences in constitution-making 
involving rhetorical resources, public law and political theory arguments regarding 
the foundations of a political regime.
The practice of constitutional debates demands “borrowing, learning and ac-
commodation, but also moments of creative innovation and experimentation”. The 
mixture of mythical elements rooted in the national history of a country with political 
values and comparative legal experiences demonstrate that “constitutional design is 
nothing if not audacious” [Ginsburg 2012: 1–3]. MPs enrich parliamentary delibera-
tions by usually introducing a variety of political concepts and arguments in innova-
tive ways. Therefore, this analysis takes the debates of the Spanish constitutional 
debate of 1931 as both a basic source for lawmaking in the building of democratic 
regimes and a case of conceptual innovation in the use of classic political concepts 
and ideas. In doing so it examines some of the central topics of political theory, 
namely, freedoms, rights, the state, legitimacy, justice or property, among others.
These topics of political theory in constitutional debates combine the perspective of 
legal expertise provided by MPs with the role of parliaments as assemblies for political 
deliberation. Hence, parliaments are relevant to political theory or philosophy insofar 
as they provide the basic intellectual context of public deliberations. Constitutional 
debates show how theoretical pondering over, for example, the acknowledgement of 
individual liberties, the limits to state action, the broadening of social rights or, more 
generally, the use of political concepts and ideas proceeds in political deliberations.
Institutional design in constitution-making periods is never resolved definitely. 
Rather, constitutional debates open to public debates all kinds of ideological disagree-
ments that are common to parliamentary politics. Dissent is not relegated to sidelines, 
but is a constitutive aspect of parliamentary activity where opposed views become 
“a condition for a thorough understanding of the question” [Palonen 2019: 46].
This analysis combines political theory, conceptual history and parliamentary 
history as three complementary approaches. As interdisciplinary basis to study the 
constitutional debate of 1931, it assumes that political concepts are dependent from 
both the institutional context and those deliberations in which they appear. Therefore, 
conceptual originality in the use of political terms is always produced as a conse-
quence of multiple contested political choices publicly debated.
Examining political theory or philosophy resources (ideas, theories, arguments, con-
troversies) in parliamentary debates of constituent moments has barely been researched in 
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the case of 20th-century Spain. This analysis focuses on the debates held around religious 
freedom, the structure of the state, the aim given to reformist policies or the extension of 
social rights, among others. In doing so, it highlights the contested meanings of central 
concepts such as state, constitution, sovereignty or reform through the revision of the 
political arguments raised by MPs and the analysis made by journalists and scholars.
THE CONTEXT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATE OF 1931
This study looks into a constituent moment that receives the influences of inter-
war trends of constitutional theory and political philosophy. Democratic socialism, 
centre-right liberalism and traditionalist conservatism can be identified as the three 
main ideological influences in Parliament. The division of parties between left and 
right was clear from the very beginning of constitutional debates, with the exception 
of the Group in the Service of the Republic. This party was composed by intellectuals 
such as the philosopher José Ortega y Gasset and the writer and journalist Ramón 
Pérez de Ayala, whose intellectual affinities were plural.
Briefly said, the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party and the Republican Action 
Party represented democratic socialism; the Radical Republican Party, the Progres-
sive Republican Party, the Democratic Liberal Republican Party and some agrarian 
MPs represented classic liberalism; the Basque-Navarre Minority and the Popular 
Agrarian Minority regarded Spanish traditionalism as the answer against wide re-
formist policies by the coalition government, even if some agrarian representatives 
were in favour whether of imitating or improving the Spanish Constitution of 1876.
As case study, the constitutional debate of 1931 illustrates why political discus-
sions in constituent moments, shaping the structure and functioning of the state, are 
the key to building a democratic regime. The variety of opposed arguments reveals 
innovative uses of political concepts by MPs, intellectuals and journalists, and a fruit-
ful path to frame the constitutional principles of a new state.
The democratic republic that resulted from the passing of the Constitution of 
1931 is understood by its protagonists in different, sometimes incompatible, ways. 
Among left-wing representatives, it means the break with the Spanish tradition as-
sociated with despotism by founding an ambitious democratic state with extensive 
competences on social and economic issues. Among liberal and conservative parties, 
instead, the new democratic Constitution is an instrument to assure the permanence 
of the republican regime through gradual reforms. Moderate left-wing representatives 
tackled the issue of the democratic nature of the republic since the inaugural address 
of the leader of the Constitutional Committee, Luis Jiménez de Asúa. He emphasises 
the principles of the constitutional project as being “full of the living political blood 
provided by democratic veins” [DSCCRE 27 August 1931: 644].
The political context is relevant to understand the atmosphere of the constitu-
tional debate. The dictatorship of general Miguel Primo de Rivera (1923–1930) is 
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followed by two short-lived monarchic cabinets, namely those of Lieutenant General 
Dámaso Berenguer and Admiral Juan Bautista Aznar. On 12 April 1931, Bautista 
Aznar’s “concentration government” calls local elections whose results in the cities 
were favourable to republican parties, whereas in rural areas monarchic candidates 
obtained a large majority of the vote [Tusell 2004: 240–242].
Aznar’s cabinet, King Alfonso XIII, and republican supporters take these elec-
tions as a plebiscite on the monarchy, hence the results meaning a serious questioning 
of the regime. On 14 April 1931, a republic is proclaimed in the streets of the cities 
of Vigo, Éibar, San Sebastián, Valencia and Barcelona. Count of Romanones, state 
minister, advises Alfonso XIII to resign. The king agrees and a provisional, pro-
republican government is established [Gil Pecharromán 1989: 28]. This coalition 
government calls general election for 28 June 1931.
The distribution of parliamentary seats (470) is hard to clarify since some par-
ties modified their names and some elected representatives changed parties after 
the general election. These circumstances also explain the weakness of the party 
system in Spain in 1931 [Tusell 1982: 160]. Despite them, gathering the informa-
tion collected by historian Javier Tusell from provinces, it is possible to itemise the 
results as follows: Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (115), Radical Republican Party 
(90), Radical Socialist Republican Party (63), Republican Left of Catalonia (29), 
Republican Action Party (26), Progressive Republican Party (25), Popular Agrar-
ian Minority (24), Autonomous Galician Republican Organization (16), Federal 
Republican Party (16), Group in the Service of the Republic (13), Basque-Navarre 
Minority (11), other minority groups under 2% of seats and independent MPs (42) 
[Tusell 1982: 161–196].1
The provisional government hurriedly adopted rules of procedure, agreed only 
one month before the beginning of the constituent sessions. They set up clear proce-
dural principles for discussing motions through sixty-four articles published as decree 
in the state’s official journal [“Gaceta de Madrid” 12 July 1931: 341]. These principles 
became a resource for minority groups in Parliament to act as the real opposition to 
the government. The parliamentary procedure aimed to reasonably regulate debates 
by fixing a set of rules which parties in the opposition could accept. Even if it was 
not passed by Parliament, the official procedure served to channel deliberative ses-
sions offering minority parties the chance to actively participate: MPs’ speeches were 
assigned irrespective of the number of seats obtained by parliamentary groups. MPs’ 
turns were confirmed after parties asked to speak. Then, the order of formal petitions 
to the speaker (presidente) of Parliament was the criterion for deciding speeches.
Before the constitutional debate begins and elections are held, on 6 May 1931, the 
provisional government sets up a Legal Advisory Committee to make the preliminary 
1  Tusell uses different acronyms for naming the same political parties. Particularly, he distinguishes 
Basque Nationalist Party from Traditionalist Communion since they were different parties. Here I classify 
both parties together in the Basque-Navarre Minority, which worked as a single minority group in Parliament.
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draft of the Constitution. At the end, the preliminary draft is rejected by Parliament 
on 6 July 1931, being considered a conservative draft by left-wing representatives. 
On 28 July of that year, a new Constitutional Committee, including 21 members, 
led by the socialist MP Luis Jiménez de Asúa, revises that first document. The new 
draft is closer to the demands of left-wing parties and it is finally accepted to be 
discussed in Parliament [Juliá 2009: 42–43], bringing forward the ideological divi-
sion in the chamber.
Rival theses about Spanish and European history made visible two alternatives 
over lawmaking: the first of them, opposition MPs argue, has a moderate character 
that improves the parliamentary tradition of 19th-century Spain without breaking the 
historical ties with it; the second of them, shared by a large majority of the coalition 
government, conceives of the newborn democratic regime as an opportunity for en-
tirely renewing the country’s institutions, breaking at the same time with conservative 
constitutionalism and Spanish traditionalism. Republican MPs portray themselves as 
heirs to Cádiz’s liberal constituents to continue their unfinished revolutionary endea-
vours with the aim of building a society of equal civil and political rights [González 
Calleja, Cobo Romero, Martínez Rus, Sánchez Pérez 2015: 11].
HISTORICAL AND INTELLECTUAL INFLUENCES ON THE SPANISH 
CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATE
Interwar democratic experiences of constitution-making in Europe and some 
countries in America, mainly Mexico (1917), are influential in the Spanish debate 
of 1931. The course of the debate is also determined by the social and political cir-
cumstances of the new regime, a republic, that was aimed to replace General Miguel 
Primo de Rivera’s dictatorship: partisan fragmentation in Parliament, together with 
86% of MPs lacking political experience in national politics, economic instability, 
and the mobilisation of masses through trade unions, among others. The debate of 
1931 reflects these features by means of a renewed and polysemic political language 
inspired by other constitutional experiences, especially those of Weimar (1919) and 
Austria (1920).
The Weimar Constitution is the main example for Spanish left-wing MPs. The 
broadening of social rights in the Constitution of 1931 aims to protect workers against 
exploitation, to provide social welfare, to universalise the access to primary education 
and to secure that justice is free for those economically needy. The social orientation 
of the first republican government (April 1931 – November 1933) demands budgetary 
plans that are difficult to assume since the economic circumstances of the country 
worsen over that time span.
Tensions between left-wing and right-wing MPs during the debate run parallel 
to the inner conflicts in the coalition government. Right-wing conservative MPs are 
opposed to any kind of secularisation by the state, whereas anticlerical movements 
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intensify their activity in the streets. Moderate centre-right and centre-left MPs argue 
in favour of realistic reformist policies that can be accepted by a large majority of 
society without paralysing the economic capacity of the state. However, they hold 
a very reduced influence due to their low number of seats in Parliament.
The Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party together with left-wing and centre radicals 
agree on ambitious reformist policies extending the competences of the state if sup-
ported by a majority of MPs in Parliament, as it finally happened. Property rights and 
religious freedom are key issues in the constitutional agenda, which is especially rich 
from an argumentative perspective but also divisive for eventual agreements. MP 
Álvaro de Albornoz (Radical Socialist Republican Party) summarises that cleavage 
between right-wing and left-wing parties by rejecting any possible agreement: “I also 
hear to say that a constitution is always a transaction, a compromise among parties. 
I do think that such a view is totally wrong, because I do not know any political 
constitution that had been an agreement among the different parties” [DSCCRE 7 
October 1931: 1561].
Some sessions during the months of September, October and November 1931 
give rise to a high number of political concerns that are the result of sui generis in-
terpretations of interwar constitutionalism by Spanish constituent members. Leading 
MPs such as the socialists Julián Besteiro and Fernando de los Ríos (both belonging 
to the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party) were acquainted with German and French 
constitutional theory. De los Ríos, for instance, translated Georg Jellinek’s writings 
into Spanish. Among conservative MPs, José María Gil-Robles (Popular Agrarian 
Minority), Antonio Royo Villanova (Popular Agrarian Minority) and Ángel Ossorio 
y Gallardo (independent) had a large education in French administrative law to the 
extent of making some well recognised academic contributions in the field.
Royo Villanova mentions the legacy of the French public law scholar Léon Du-
guit to emphasise the parliamentary nature of the new democratic regime: 
I think that the republic should be frankly parliamentary. I understand that Parliament, 
with all its faults, is the highest guarantee of freedom and discussion; and not certainly 
because of the political reason that it can better respond to national sovereignty, but 
because what a French writer, certainly far from parliamentary superstition, follower of 
the school of the famous Duguit, calls, reason of legal technique [DSCCRE 23 October 
1931: 644].
Democracy and parliamentarism are considered coterminous in Europe before 
World War II. The idea of parliamentarism is addressed as the ideal state form of 
European democracies. The opposite term is “antidemocracy”. In the interwar period, 
dictatorship and models of direct democracy are usually taken as threats to parlia-
mentary democracy [Aragón Reyes 1996: 58]. Also in the Spanish constitutional 
debate this identification of Parliament and democracy occurs, as Royo Villanova’s 
words highlight.
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In 20th-century Spain, anti-parliamentarism is first represented by Miguel Primo 
de Rivera’s dictatorship, whose critics against the 19th-century Spanish representative 
system find supporters among the national press, as Víctor Pradera in the monarchic 
newspaper “ABC” [Cuenca Toribio 1995: 252–253]. After the fall of the dictatorship 
and the proclamation of the republic in the streets, only traditionalist movements 
are openly unparliamentary and antidemocratic. Parliamentarism, instead, gains 
relevance. In the Spain of that time, the term means two different realities: on the 
one hand, parliamentarism is a synonym for parliamentary system of government, 
where government and Parliament cooperate with each other; on the other hand, 
it denotes a representative regime in a wider sense [Fernández Sarasola 2009: 249].
CONCEPTUAL CONTROVERSIES OVER STATE AND SOVEREIGNTy
MPs discuss the role of the state along constitutional sessions. “State” and “so-
vereignty” are key terms in the large majority of deliberations in Parliament between 
September and November 1931. According to the analysis of Juan F. García Santos, 
adjectives such as “monarchic”, “old”, “republican”, “liberal”, “legal”, “bourgeois”, 
“socialist” and “Soviet” become terms associated with the idea of state during the 
Spanish Second Republic (1931–1939) [García Santos 1980: 440]. Here, I briefly 
select some parliamentary controversies held in September 1931 over the ideas and 
models of sovereignty and state.
It is significant that in the first years of the Spanish Second Republic, some jurists 
leave aside both Krausism and legal liberalism with the aim of building a renewed 
political science. Political law of German roots reinforces the legal technique of 
positivism through the role of legislators [Gordillo Pérez, Martín, Vázquez Alonso 
2017: 54]. This context provides a fertile field for Spanish constituent representatives 
to deliberate on the traditional meanings of “state” and “sovereignty”.
Influences of German and French models on Spanish MPs are sometimes trans-
lated into the language of two opposite historical models. Thus, the centrist MP 
Ricardo Samper (Radical Republican Party) distinguishes a historical German state 
based on the idea of state’s power from the national and progressive model of France:
Between the state-power of the German historical type, that unleashed the European 
war, and the nation state which is practised in France, I declare in favour of the nation 
state. And I think, after all, that the state is no more than a management of public services, 
and that individual rights and freedoms are above the state and cannot be constrained 
except when it is required by living together and the coordination with the law and the 
freedom of the other citizens [DSCCRE 11 September 1931: 871].
The idea of national sovereignty is contested during the constitutional debates, 
whereas popular sovereignty is widely accepted among left-wing and right-wing par-
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ties, with the exception of some traditionalists. For instance, Mariano Ruiz-Funes, of 
the Republican Action Party, understands popular sovereignty as the source of public 
powers. He stands against the idea that democratic power is the result of agreements 
between political parties: “We had to define in the Constitution what was the origin 
of power in a democratic republic. It was not a superior origin, it was not one of 
agreed nature, but an eminently popular one” [DSCCRE 11 September 1931: 882].
Among federalist representatives, Joaquín Pi y Arsuaga, of the Federal Repub-
lican Party, argues against the idea of national sovereignty. He matches national 
sovereignty to antidemocratic practices of monarchs and to the malfunction of the 
division of state powers: 
We do believe that the sovereignty of the nation is something which resembles the 
sovereignty of kings. It was that thing about the rule of everyone by a single one. Natio-
nal sovereignty means the denial of democracy, of the rule of the people by the people. 
And it is also a denial of the division of powers between the legislative, the executive 
and the judiciary. They have to be completely autonomous, since that autonomy avoids 
the meddling of one of the powers in the rest, which we think is possible [DSCCRE 15 
September 1931: 922].
According to Luis Araquistáin, of the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party, the 
concept of sovereignty is also central to the distribution of competences between 
the state and the regions. He understands “autonomy” and “sovereignty” as close 
terms, referring the latter to the capacity of regions, especially Catalonia, to assume 
competences without the interference of the state: 
All the confusion, all the blindness, all the excitement around the autonomy of 
Catalonia comes from a misinterpretation, by most of the Spanish people, of a concept 
stressed in the writings and discussions of Catalans: the concept of sovereignty. We want, 
partisans of autonomy say, to draw the limits, the political frontiers, to note the “exten-
sion” of our sovereignty. But within those limits, frontiers and extensions, we aim to 
be the highest. We need an “intensive” sovereignty, without nation state’s interferences. 
This is the basic thesis of Catalan autonomy [Araquistáin 1930: 124].
Some right-wing MPs, such as Juan Castrillo, of the Progressive Republican 
Party, agree to coordinate autonomy and sovereignty in the case of autonomous re-
gions: “As I understand it, there is no weakening of sovereignty. There is a full and 
decisive statement of autonomies. There where autonomy arises, it necessarily rises 
up a joint participation [of the state and the region] in the sovereignty” [DSCCRE 
22 September 1931: 1040].
The meanings given to state and sovereignty along the constitutional sessions 
are connected with the different issues covered in the parliamentary agenda (from 
the separation between church and state to the decentralisation of competences in 
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the hands of the regions). Nevertheless, both terms remain central to understanding 
how constituent representatives reinterpreted European public law to build the basis 
of Spanish democracy.
CONCLUSIONS
In this article, I have firstly introduced some remarks to the study of constitutio-
nal debates applying methodological resources of political theory or philosophy and 
conceptual history. Secondly, I have selected the Spanish constitutional debate of 
1931 as a special moment where the building of a democratic regime, after a seven
-year dictatorship, provides a fertile ground for the development of new meanings 
of classic political concepts. Thirdly, the article has examined the main historical 
and intellectual influences that the constituent representatives had. Finally, by way 
of example, I have presented some ideological controversies over the meanings of 
“state” and “sovereignty” risen in the parliamentary sessions of September 1931.
The article has argued that constitutional debates are a valuable resource to 
studying political theory and conceptual history. The Spanish case illustrates how 
classic political concepts are rhetorically redefined in connection with interwar legal 
and political theory. Far from being a mere sophistry, the arguments held by MPs 
aid to reveal decisive conceptual changes in the use of key political concepts. From 
a transnational perspective, it provides the basis to compare the Spanish process of 
constitution-making in 1931 with other constituent moments of interwar Europe.
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